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Abstract 
Firms have not historically called their convertible bonds as soon as they could force 
conversion. Various explanations for the delay rely on the size of the dividends that 
bondholders forgo so long as they do not convert. We investigate an important change in 
convertible security design, namely that more than 95 percent of recent convertible bond 
issues are dividend-protected. Dividend protection means that the conversion value of the 
shares into which a bond is convertible is unaffected by dividend payments and dividend-
related rationales for call delay become moot. We document that dividend-protected 
convertibles are called as soon as conversion can be forced. 
 
 
JEL classification: G2, G32 
Keywords: Call policy, Dividend protection, Convertible securities, Security design 
 
 
 
 
* Bruce D. Grundy (bruceg@unimelb.edu.au) is from the University of Melbourne and Patrick 
Verwijmeren (p.verwijmeren@vu.nl) is from VU University Amsterdam, University of Glasgow, 
Duisenberg School of Finance, and the Tinbergen Institute. We thank Renée Adams, Henk 
Berkman, Wolfgang Bühler, Marie Dutordoir, Abe de Jong, Roman Kräussl, Bryan Lim, Spencer 
Martin, Ron Masulis, Stefan Petry, Stephen Ross, Chris Veld, Terry Walter, and seminar 
participants at the 2012 LaTrobe Finance and Corporate Governance Conference, University of 
Melbourne, University of Technology Sydney, University of New South Wales, University of 
Auckland, University of Glasgow, and VU University Amsterdam for useful comments.  
 
 2
Ingersoll (1977a) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977) establish that when forced 
conversion of a convertible bond is simply a wealth redistribution from convertible 
bondholders to stockholders, stockholders will prefer to call and force conversion as soon 
as the conversion value exceeds the call price. Ingersoll (1977b) documents that a 
substantial number of firms delay calling relative to this policy, reporting that on average 
firms wait until the conversion value exceeds the call price by 43.9%. Various rationales 
for observed call delay rely crucially on the bondholders forgoing sizeable dividends so 
long as they do not convert. In testing these rationales, prior work has required attempts 
to control for current and future changes in dividend policy.1 We document that 
beginning in 2001 the design of convertible securities changed such that more recent 
convertible issues are dividend-protected. This change has nullified the dividend-related 
set of reasons for delay and provides the perfect control for current and future dividend 
policy. We document that call delay is virtually nonexistent for dividend-protected 
convertibles thus vindicating the original prediction of Ingersoll and of Brennan and 
Schwartz. 
Dividends can lead to call delay for a number of reasons. Ingersoll (1977a) 
recognizes that if there are bondholders who should be converting because of large 
common dividends but are not doing so, then management should not call and wake these 
“sleeping investors”. Constantinides and Grundy (1986) argue that dividends lead to call 
delay when firms prefer voluntary conversion over the forced conversion of a call. Harris 
and Raviv (1985) consider an asymmetric information setting. In such a world, call delay 
                                                 
1 Some rationales also require controls for current and future corporate tax rates. Further, empirical work 
should control for the value of the insurance the convertible bondholder retains as long as she does not 
convert. 
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can signal high future dividends since only more pessimistic firms unable to rely on 
dividend-induced voluntary conversion will find it optimal to call. Mikkelson (1981, 
1985), Asquith and Mullins (1991) and Asquith (1995) consider the corporate tax 
deduction associated with the coupon payments on a convertible. Call delay will then be 
optimal when firms enjoy an advantage of paying less in after-tax interest than the 
dividends they would pay were the bond converted.   
Most convertible bonds issued after 2002 are dividend-protected. The protection is 
such that the value of the shares into which the bond is convertible is immune to all but a 
liquidating dividend payment. Dividend protection means that (absent a liquidating 
dividend) there is no incentive to voluntarily convert for fear of missing a dividend and 
the Constantinides and Grundy (1986) rationale for delay, as well as its sleeping investor 
variant, cannot apply. Similarly, dividend-induced voluntary conversion in an extended 
Harris and Raviv (1985) signaling model cannot provide the rational for delay. And since 
the tax deduction associated with coupon payments cannot exceed the coupon itself, 
dividend protection such that the bondholders receive the benefit of the dividend whether 
they have converted or not obviates the Asquith and Mullins (1991) tax wedge between 
dividends and coupons as a potential rationale for call delay.  
We examine the call decisions until 1-1-2011 for 432 callable convertible bonds 
issued in the period 2000 through 2006. Dividend protection for convertible bonds has 
increased in popularity over time: there are no dividend-protected convertible bonds in 
2000, while 62 percent of the convertible bonds in our sample issued in 2003 are 
dividend-protected. In 2005, this percentage increases to 100 percent.  
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We find that the average call delay is substantial (66 days) for the non-dividend-
protected convertible bonds in our sample that are called prior to 1-1-2011, in line with 
findings of Asquith (1995) (170 days) and King and Mauer (2012) (118 days). For the 
dividend-protected convertibles in our sample that are called, the average call delay is 
just three days. When we focus on only the bonds issued in 2003, the year in which both 
designs are well represented, we confirm that the average call delay is significantly 
shorter for dividend-protected convertibles than for non-dividend-protected 
convertibles—three days versus 68 days.  
We also examine called convertible bonds in which the expected dividend to be 
received upon conversion exceeds the after-tax coupon. This is the subsample where, but 
for dividend protection, a (tax-wedge) rationale for delay might be invoked. The average 
delay for non-dividend-protected convertible bonds is 161 days in this subsample, 
whereas there is zero call delay for dividend-protected convertible bonds, in line with the 
original Ingersoll (1977a) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977) prediction.     
We conclude that call delay has virtually disappeared now that convertible bonds are 
dividend-protected. These findings highlight the importance of dividend-related 
rationales and the Ingersoll (1977a) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977) predictions on call 
delay. Asquith and Mullins (1991) observe that studies on call delay are important as a 
failure to empirically confirm clear predictions of finance theory call into question the 
usefulness and validity of our financial models. Our results show that finance theory can 
in fact be highly useful in understanding managerial behavior.  
The observed absence of call delay for dividend-protected convertible bonds also has 
implications for call delay rationales that do not depend on the firm’s dividend policy. 
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These rationales are built around (i) a desire to signal insiders’ belief of a high likelihood 
of voluntary conversion at maturity as in Harris and Raviv (1985), (ii) the required call 
notice period (Ingersoll, 1977b; Butler, 2002; Altintig and Butler, 2005), (iii) a safety 
premium and the costs of a failed call (Ingersoll, 1977b; Jaffee and Shleifer, 1990; 
Ederington, Caton, and Campbell, 1997; King and Mauer, 2012), and (iv) the recognition 
that conversion can cause a wealth transfer from stockholders to the holders of straight 
bonds and that this transfer can be avoided through call delay (Bühler and Koziol, 2004). 
The results of our study suggest that these rationales are not of first order importance in 
understanding call policy.  
We are the first to document the dividend protection of recent convertible bond 
issues. Such a sweeping design change between 2000 and 2006, whereby the fraction of 
callable convertibles that are dividend-protected has changed from virtually none to 
virtually all, raises the interesting “Why?” question. Brown, Grundy, Lewis, and 
Verwijmeren (2012) document that hedge funds, which combine long positions in 
convertible bonds with short positions in the issuer’s common stock, became the 
principal purchasers of new convertible bond issues during this period. They conclude 
that hedge fund buyers have a preference for non-callable convertibles as a non-
predictable call policy makes perfect hedging by shorting stock more difficult. But 
including a call feature can have real benefits, as call features can for example reduce 
hold-up problems in the event of a merger.2 Therefore, when a call feature is to be 
included, it is optimal from the point of view of a hedge fund buyer if any purely 
                                                 
2 Another reason to include call features is to simplify refinancing in the future (Dong, Dutordoir, and Veld, 
2012).  
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redistributive calls are a predictable function of the issuing firm’s stock price.3 When a 
convertible is dividend-protected, the call policy that maximizes stockholder wealth is 
simply to call the convertible bond as soon as conversion can be forced, making purely 
redistributive calls a predictable function of the stock price and allowing hedge funds to 
more successfully hedge their convertible bond positions. In line with this reasoning, we 
find that hedge funds are significantly more involved in dividend-protected convertibles 
than in convertibles without dividend protection. On average, in our sample, hedge funds 
purchase 76.6% of the dividend-protected convertible bonds and 68.6% of convertible 
issues without dividend protection.   
Besides its effect on call policy, the recent change in security design also has 
important implications for the correct calculation of convertible bond values and in turn 
the measurement of any underpricing at the time of issue. The algorithms used in a wide 
number of recent papers on convertible bond issuance need to be adjusted for dividend 
protection, or the theoretical value of a bond will be underestimated.4 A failure to take 
dividend protection into account will also lead to a misestimation of the delta of a 
convertible and the size of delta-neutral positions.5 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the 
implications of dividend protection for call policy. Section II describes our data set and 
provides information on the proportion of convertible securities that are dividend-
                                                 
3 When a convertible is not dividend-protected, the call policy that maximizes the wealth of stockholders 
will depend on the likelihood of future dividend changes and calls will not be perfectly predictable.   
4 Prior studies that use these algorithms include Chan and Chen (2007), Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld 
(2009), Zabolotnyuk, Jones, and Veld (2010), and De Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren (2011).  
5 The delta of a convertible is the convertible’s dollar sensitivity to small changes in the value of the 
underlying. See Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1999, 2003), Choi, Getmansky, and Tookes (2009) and De 
Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren  (2011) on hedge funds’ determination of delta-neutral hedge ratios. 
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protected. Section III presents our empirical tests on call policy for convertibles with and 
without dividend protection. Section IV contains our conclusions.  
 
I. Forced conversion and dividend protection 
Although convertible bonds issued in the 20th century were protected against stock 
dividends, stock splits, and extraordinary cash dividends (typically defined in the 
prospectuses as dividends exceeding 10% or 15% of the stock price), the bonds’ 
conversion rates were not adjusted for regular cash dividends. Constantinides and Grundy 
(1986) posit that call delay can then be optimal when the dividends to be received upon 
conversion are, or are expected to be, sufficiently large that convertible holders have an 
incentive to voluntarily convert. Voluntary conversion avoids the costs of a formal call 
and further, as Ingersoll (1977a) recognized, if there are bondholders who should be 
converting because of large common dividends but are not doing so, then management 
should not call and wake these “sleeping investors”. Waking these convertible 
bondholders would only hurt the common stock owners who benefit from the convertible 
owners’ mistake.6   
Harris and Raviv (1985) consider an asymmetric information setting and show that 
call delay can serve as a credible signal of good private information. Insiders who expect 
their firms to do well will believe that there is little to be gained by forcing conversion 
early since the bondholders will elect to convert at maturity. Pessimistic insiders will 
                                                 
6 Constantinides and Grundy (1986) document that in many instances stockholders have been better off by 
letting sleeping bondholders lie and redistributing wealth away from widows and orphans whose portfolios 
are managed by less than diligent trustees. For convertible preferred stock, Dunn and Eades (1989) show 
that convertible preferred stockholders fail to convert despite much higher dividends to be received upon 
conversion into common stock than are received on the preferred stock.  
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consider that delay is costly, since a failure to call today will leave the bondholders with a 
valuable option not to convert later. A natural extension of the Harris and Raviv (1985) 
model considers private information concerning dividend growth and the future incentive 
for voluntary conversion. Call delay can effectively signal high future dividends since 
only more pessimistic firms unable to rely on dividend-induced voluntary conversion will 
find it optimal to call.7 
The corporate tax wedge between coupons and dividends can potentially explain call 
delays for a larger set of firms than can be explained by the Constantinides and Grundy 
(1986) or the extended Harris and Raviv (1985) analyses. Mikkelson (1981, 1985), 
Asquith and Mullins (1991) and Asquith (1995) consider the corporate tax deduction 
associated with the coupon payments on a convertible. This deduction can not only 
exceed any excess of the bond’s coupon over the dividends to be received upon 
conversion, but can also offset the insurance provided by the bondholders’ option not to 
convert. In such a case a firm will optimally not call and force conversion. And provided 
the coupon does exceed the dividends to be received upon conversion, the bondholders 
will not voluntarily convert. Note that this third explanation of call delay also depends on 
the firm’s dividends being sufficiently large—if, for example, dividends were zero, 
equity holders would always prefer calling since the tax saving associated with the 
coupon could not exceed the coupon payment itself.  
The first convertible bond issue with full dividend protection of which we are aware 
is a Vector Group issue in 2001. The second, by Cubist Pharmaceuticals, also occurs in 
                                                 
7 Ofer and Natarajan (1987), Acharya (1988), Campbell, Ederington and Vankudre (1991), Ederington, 
Caton and Campbell (1997) and King and Mauer (2012) empirically investigate signaling models of call 
delay. 
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2001. Most prospectuses of dividend-protected convertibles have a sentence describing a 
conversion rate adjustment of the form “Subject to the terms of the indenture, we will 
adjust the conversion rate for cash dividends or other cash distributions to all or 
substantially all holders of our common stock.” The typical formula for the adjustment is:  
                                                  1 0
cum div
cum div
SCR CR
S d
    ,                                         (1) 
where CR1 is the conversion rate in effect after the payment of a dividend of d per share; 
CR0 is the conversion rate in effect prior to the dividend payment; and cum divS  is the cum-
dividend stock price.8  
Theorem 11 of Merton (1973) demonstrates that when a call option’s price is 
homogeneous of degree one in the value of the underlying asset and the exercise price, 
then the call’s value will be unaffected by dividend payments provided that the number of 
shares received upon exercise of the option is increased by a factor of 
cum div
cum div
S
S d . The 
adjustment to the conversion terms of a dividend-protected convertible bond given in (1) 
is analogous to the call option dividend protection of Merton’s Theorem 11. But just as 
Black and Scholes (1973) observed that no adjustment can protect a call option from a 
liquidating dividend, a liquidating dividend will similarly render a convertible bond 
valueless.  
                                                 
8 When the stock price drop on the ex-dividend date is smaller than one (see for example Campbell and 
Beranek, 1955; Elton and Gruber, 1970; Bali and Hite, 1998), the holders of convertible bonds with 
dividend protection are actually (slightly) better off when a dividend is paid. This observation increases 
incentives to force conversion and does not alter our prediction of zero call delay for dividend-protected 
convertible bonds. 
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Theorem 1: Suppose a bond is “dividend-protected” in that the conversion rate 
increases by a factor of 
cum div
cum div
S
S d in the event of a promised dividend per share of d. 
Bondholders will not voluntarily convert unless the dividend is so large that if all 
bondholders did convert prior to the dividend payment, the dividend would liquidate the 
firm. 
Proof: Suppose a firm has n shares, a dividend-protected convertible bond, and assets 
worth V. Suppose the firm announces a dividend of d per share. If the convertible holder 
does not convert in response to the dividend distribution, then the firm will have assets of 
V nd  ex-dividend and the maximum ex-dividend value of the convertible is firm value; 
i.e., V nd . If the bond is converted prior to the dividend payment, the bondholder will 
have an equity claim on the firm worth 0
0
CR V
n CR
   
. Thus a sufficient condition for the 
convertible bondholder to prefer to convert early is that the firm announces a value for d 
such that 0
0
CR V V nd
n CR
     
. The inequality can be rewritten as d nCR0  V ; i.e., 
the dividend per share is so large that if the convertible holder converts early, the attempt 
to pay the promised dividend to all 0n CR  shareholders would liquidate the firm. In that 
event the dividend per share actually distributed will equal
0
V
n CR and the cum-dividend 
share price will also be 
0
V
n CR . Thus the denominator of the multiplicative factor in 
relation (1) will be zero when the denominator is measured as   actual cum divS d  and 
1CR will be undefined.  
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But when d nCR0  V , the dividend protection is such that the bondholder will 
prefer to delay conversion. By converting early the bondholder receives 0
cum divCR S . If 
the bondholder does delay conversion, the convertible must be worth at least its ex-
dividend conversion value of  1 cum divCR S d  . This can be rewritten as 
   1 0 0cum divcum div cum div cum divcum divSCR S d CR S d CR SS d          . 
Thus whenever the announced dividend per share is not so large that its payment 
would lead to liquidation of the firm, the protection afforded by the adjustment to the 
conversion terms given by (1) is sufficient to guarantee that the bondholder will not 
convert early. QED 
The importance of dividend-protection for call policy is that future dividend 
payments cannot provide a rationale for delaying the call of a dividend-protected 
convertible. The Constantinides-Grundy argument that high dividends can induce 
voluntary conversion and thereby avoid the costs of a formal call is not applicable when 
dividend protection guarantees that the bondholders will not voluntarily convert. An 
extended variant of the Harris-Raviv model in which call delay signals that future 
dividends are likely to be so high that the bonds will be voluntarily converted is also not 
applicable. Further, Ingersoll’s “sleeping investor” hypothesis cannot be invoked. 
Theorem 1 shows that bondholders will not voluntarily convert because their unconverted 
bonds are more valuable than the shares they would receive by converting. Since these 
are the same shares they would receive if forced to convert, whether they do not convert 
because not converting is rationally optimal (as in Theorem 1) or because they are simply 
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asleep is irrelevant. Either way the firm’s equityholders would be better off calling and 
forcing conversion.  
The Asquith-Mullins tax wedge argument also does not provide a rational for 
delaying the call of a dividend-protected convertible. Suppose that over a coming interval 
the firm will pay coupons on the bond of c in total and a dividend per share of d. If the 
firm does not call at the beginning of the period, the bondholders will receive the coupons 
with an after-tax cost of  1 c  and will obtain a claim on the firm worth at least 
 1 cum divCR S d  . The cost of not calling is then at least  
         1 0 01 1 1 .cum divcum div cum div cum divcum divSc CR S d c CR S d c CR SS d                 
 
If the firm calls and forces conversion at the beginning of the period, the bondholders 
claim on the firm is reduced to 0
cum divCR S . Even though there is a tax wedge, the 
equityholders strictly prefer calling. 
Note that Theorem 1 does not imply that dividend protection means that the 
convertible’s value is unaffected by the dividend, only that non-liquidating dividends will 
not coerce convertible holders into converting early. To see that the bond’s value may not 
be fully protected, we first recognize that the protected convertible can be viewed as 
having the same payoffs as a package of a straight bond plus a European conversion 
option to give up the straight bond’s payoff at maturity and instead receive a number of 
shares at maturity. That number of shares is determined by the adjusted conversion rate at 
maturity. Even if Merton’s Theorem 11 conditions are satisfied and the value of the 
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conversion option is protected against dividends, dividend payments will reduce the 
security for, and hence the value of, the straight bond component of the convertible. 
Most dividend-protected convertibles have protection in the form of the adjustment 
to the conversion terms given by (1) for all cash dividends, regardless of the size of the 
dividend. However, an interesting subset of issues does not give full dividend protection, 
but only provides protection if the cash dividend exceeds a specified dollar amount or a 
specified dividend yield. The specified levels are typically relatively low and are called a 
“dividend threshold”. For example, the prospectus for a 2004 Reebok International issue 
states “the conversion rate will be adjusted if we make regular cash dividends to all or 
substantially all holders of our common stock in excess of $0.15 per share in any semi-
annual period”. Reebok paid a semi-annual dividend of exactly $0.15 per share in 2004 
and 2005 (before being acquired by Adidas) and the conversion rate was not adjusted in 
these years.  
We only classify issues as having dividend protection when the dividend threshold 
multiplied by the conversion rate is smaller than the after-tax coupon. Only if the 
dividend threshold multiplied by the conversion rate were greater than the after-tax 
coupon could a firm justify not calling by paying the threshold dividend and invoking the 
Asquith and Mullins tax wedge argument.9  
Our sample of 432 convertible bonds, which we describe in Section II, contains 33 
convertible bonds with a minimum threshold amount expressed in dollar terms and 26 
convertible bonds with a minimum threshold dividend yield. For 30 of the 33 convertible 
                                                 
9 Delay could not be justified by either the Constantinides and Grundy argument or the extended Harris and 
Raviv argument unless the dividend threshold multiplied by the conversion rate was greater than the 
coupon itself.  
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bonds with a minimum dollar threshold amount the conversion rate multiplied by the 
threshold dividend amount per share is less than the after-tax coupon and we classify 
these bonds as protected.10 For the other three bonds the partial protection might 
potentially be used to justify not calling and hence we classify these three bonds as 
unprotected.   
The 26 bonds in our sample with relatively low threshold dividend yields have 
threshold yields of 1%, 1.25%, 1.4%, 2%, 2.5% and 3.75%. For 12 of the 26 convertible 
bonds the conversion rate times the threshold dividend yield times the stock price at the 
time of the convertible’s issuance is less than the after-tax coupon. We classify these 
convertible bonds as dividend-protected and classify the remaining 14 bonds with 
threshold yields as unprotected. In a robustness test in Section III we exclude convertibles 
with minimum threshold amounts and yields from our analysis. 
 
II. Data 
We collect U.S. convertible issuances from the Securities Data Company (SDC) for 
the period January 2000 to December 2006. We require that the issuing firms have an 
offering prospectus available on the SEC’s Edgar database and that the convertibles have 
call features.11 We delete issues by financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities 
                                                 
10 To estimate the marginal tax rate, we use Graham’s simulated tax database, which can be downloaded 
from his website - http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform.html. We multiply the annual coupon 
payment by one minus the firm’s marginal corporate tax rate in the year of offering. In a robustness test, we 
have used a marginal tax rate of 35% for all our observations. This changes only one of our classifications 
and leaves our conclusions unchanged. 
11 We originally also collected convertibles issued from 2007 until 2010 with call features and an offering 
prospectus available on the SEC’s Edgar database, but all but two of these convertibles are still in their call 
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(SIC 4900-4999).12 We further exclude convertible preferred stock, exchangeable 
securities, equity units, purchase contracts, and floating rate convertibles. This leaves 432 
plain vanilla convertible bond issues that have call features and for which we have 
detailed information on their design characteristics. Panel A of Table I sets out 
descriptive statistics for the convertible bonds in our sample. 
 
 
[ insert Table I here ] 
 
 
 
The average issue size of the convertible bonds in our sample is $256 million, and 
the average conversion premium is 33 percent. The average time to maturity when first 
issued is 15.56 years.13 The average time to first call is 4.33 years, meaning that on 
average a convertible bond is call-protected for more than 4 years. We find that 23 
percent of the convertibles in our sample have a provisional redemption feature. 
Provisional redemption features specify that the firm is only allowed to call the bond 
when the stock price exceeds the conversion price by a specified percentage for a 
specified number of trading days within a given time period. This percentage is typically 
30, 40, or 50 percent and the number of trading days is typically 20 in a 30 day period.14 
                                                                                                                                                 
protection period at 1-1-2011 (the conversion option of these two convertibles are still out-of-the-money at 
1-1-2011), and are thus not informative on call delay.  
12 Financial institutions represent 17.6% of the convertible issues over our sample period, whereas utilities 
represent 4.6%. 
13 We find that 69 convertibles are issued with five years to maturity, 84 with seven years, six with eight 
years, 15 with 10 years, one with 11 years, two with 12 years, one with 15 years, 207 with 20 years, one 
with 21 years, and 46 with 30 years to maturity. 
14 Provisional redemption features are also referred to as soft call protection features (Korkeamaki and 
Moore, 2004). 
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In most cases a provisional redemption feature expires a few years after issuance, after 
which an optional redemption feature comes into effect. Optional redemption features 
typically include a call schedule, indicating, for example, that the call price is 102 percent 
in the third year after issue, 101 percent in the fourth year after issue, and 100 percent 
thereafter. Approximately half of the convertibles (53%) include a right for the 
convertible holder to put the convertible bond back to the issuer on specified dates at a 
specified price.  
We find that 57 percent of the convertible bonds in our sample are protected against 
regular cash dividends. Panel B shows the percentage of convertible bonds in our sample 
with dividend protection segregated by year of issue. Overall, we find a relatively high 
number of convertible issues in 2001, 2003 and 2004, which is consistent with 
observations in Choi, Getmansky and Tookes (2009) and Lewis and Verwijmeren (2011). 
Before 2003, the vast majority of convertible bonds are not dividend-protected, while 
after 2003 the large majority is dividend-protected. Both designs (with dividend 
protection and without dividend protection) are well represented in 2003.  
Table II shows whether and how the convertible bonds in our sample are retired. One 
way of retiring a convertible bond issue is to call (redeem) the bonds. We search for 
information on call announcements in Factiva, the FISD Mergent database, and the 
annual reports of firms. In Factiva we also search whether the convertible issues are 
retired in other ways, namely through a merger, bankruptcy, an exchange of the 
convertible bonds for other securities, full repurchase of the bonds, a full exercise of a put 
feature by the convertible bondholders, or a full voluntary conversion of the bond by the 
convertible bondholders. Information on mergers and bankruptcies is also obtained from 
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delisting classifications in CRSP. Information on exchanges, full repurchases, exercised 
put features, and full voluntary conversion is also obtained from the annual reports. We 
search all databases until 1-1-2011. There are no bonds with sinking funds in our sample, 
meaning that there are no fixed schemes that require the firm to periodically retire the 
convertible bond. 
 
[ insert Table II here ] 
 
We find that 85 convertible bonds are retired because of a merger. It is common for 
convertible bonds to have poison put features that allow the holder to put the convertibles 
back to the firm in the event of a merger.15 An additional feature of some convertible 
bonds is a make-whole provision. In virtually all recent deals, a make-whole provision is 
included that states that the conversion price is decreased in the event of certain 
fundamental corporate changes, such as an acquisition by a private company or a 
delisting of the underlying stock. This feature compensates investors for transactions or 
events that take away the value of the option imbedded in the convertible bond.16 The 
                                                 
15 These features state that “In the event of a change in control, each holder will have the right subject to the 
terms and conditions of the indenture, to require us to purchase for cash all or any portion of the holder’s 
debentures, in integral multiples of $1,000 principal amount. The purchase price for such debenture will 
equal the aggregate principal amount of such debenture plus the accrued interest.” 
16 A cash-out merger is one such transaction – the bonds become convertible solely into the merger 
consideration (which is all cash in this example) and the bondholders lose any future upside potential and 
the related imbedded option value of the convert is lost. Another example is a delisting of the underlying 
stock, an event that decreases the option value significantly, since it impairs the liquidity of the underlying 
stock. Investors are compensated for this loss in option value by a reduction in the conversion price of the 
bonds. An example of a make-whole provision is as follows: “If a change in control occurs and all of the 
consideration for the common stock in the transaction or transactions constituting the change in control 
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preferred choice for holders of in-the-money convertibles at a time of a merger could be 
to simply convert the bond into shares. In some cases the merged company takes over the 
convertible bond. We find that none of the 85 convertibles that expired because of a 
merger can provide information on call delay: 60 convertibles are out-of-the-money at the 
time of the merger, while 25 are in-the-money but still call-protected. 
We further find that 26 convertible bonds are retired because of the issuer’s 
bankruptcy, while ten convertible bonds are exchanged in capital restructurings. An 
additional nine firms repurchased the complete offering before maturity. Six convertibles 
are completely put back to the firm (i.e. a 100 percent of investors exercise the 
convertible’s put option). We observe that no convertible issue that is retired because of a 
merger, bankruptcy, exchange, full repurchase, or put feature exhibits a delay in calling, 
as all convertibles that are retired because of these reasons are out-of-the-money upon 
retirement or are still in their call protection period upon retirement. 
We find that 135 of the remaining 296 convertible bonds have been called. We 
examine these 135 convertible bond calls in the beginning of Section III. The remaining 
161 convertible bonds are not called. For 57 of these bonds the call protection period had 
not expired on 1-1-2011. The remaining 104 convertible bonds matured, are still 
                                                                                                                                                 
consists of cash, which we will refer to as a “cash buy-out,” we will pay a make-whole premium to the 
holders of the notes in addition to the purchase price of the notes on the date of purchase. The make-whole 
premium will also be paid to holders of the notes who convert their notes into common stock. The make-
whole premium per note will equal (a) the average of the closing trading prices of a note for the five trading 
days immediately prior to our public announcement of the cash buy-out, less (b) the greater of (i) $1,000 or 
(ii) the product of (x) average closing prices of our common stock for the five trading days immediately 
prior to our public announcement of the cash buy-out and (y) the applicable conversion rate; and will be 
payable in cash or common stock at our option. The make-whole premium, if any, will not be less than 
zero.” 
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outstanding, or are fully voluntary converted. We examine these 104 convertible bonds at 
the end of Section III as it could have been optimal for firms to call these bonds. 
 
III. Empirical analysis 
In this section we examine call policies for convertible bonds with and without 
dividend protection. We first focus on convertible bonds that have been called, and then 
analyze convertibles that have not been called. 
 
A. Convertibles that have been called 
To calculate call delay, we need to determine whether and when it was optimal for 
the firm to call each bond. We classify a convertible as “in-the-money” when finance 
theory indicates that it would be optimal for the firm to call. A convertible is in-the-
money when the daily closing stock price times the conversion rate exceeds the call price 
plus accrued interest from the last coupon payment date. The call price is based on the 
call schedule. We adjust the conversion rate for stock dividends, stock splits, and 
extraordinary cash dividends. We obtain information on conversion rates and call 
schedules from the issue prospectuses and obtain information on stock prices, dividends, 
and stock splits from CRSP. 
For dividend-protected convertible bonds we also adjust the conversion rate for 
regular cash dividends. When there is a minimum threshold amount or yield specified for 
regular cash dividends, we adjust the conversion rate only for those dividends that exceed 
this minimum threshold amount or yield.  
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We find that 48 calls pertain to convertible bonds that are called out-of-the-money. 
Like most prior studies on call policy, we do not focus on these observations.17 However, 
an interesting observation is that in eight cases the call announcement occurs when the 
convertible is just out of-the-money.18 For these eight cases, the stock price on calling 
multiplied by the conversion rate is on average 96.1% of the call price. Ingersoll (1977b) 
shows that the optimal call policy in the presence of a call notice period is to call when 
the bond is just out-of-the-money. We therefore classify these eight convertibles as if 
they were called in-the-money with a call delay of zero. This leaves 40 convertible bonds 
classified as called out-of-the-money.19  
 
[ insert Table III here ] 
 
We classify 95 convertible bonds as being called in-the-money. As shown in Table 
III, this sample includes 62 convertible bonds without dividend protection and 33 
convertible bonds with dividend protection. Table IV reports issue characteristics of the 
                                                 
17 An exception is King and Mauer (2012), who find that events like asset restructurings are important 
determinants of out-of-the-money calls.  
18 After a call announcement, convertible bondholders have a limited time period to decide whether they 
will convert their bonds into shares or redeem the bonds for the call price. This time period is known as the 
call notice period and is generally around 30 days. 
19 We find that all eight convertibles are in-the-money at the end of the call notice period. Seven of the 
eight convertibles that were called just out-of-the-money but were redeemed in-the-money have no 
dividend protection. If we exclude these issues, the average call delay for non-dividend-protected 
convertibles will be higher and our results on the difference between call delay on convertibles with and 
without dividend protection (which suggest that call delay is longer for convertibles without dividend 
protection) will be stronger. The results excluding these eight convertibles are reported in Panel B of Table 
V. 
 21
convertible bonds that are called in-the-money, segregated by whether the bond is 
dividend-protected.20  
 
[ please insert Table IV here ] 
 
On average, the issue proceeds of non-dividend-protected convertibles are 312 
million dollars, whereas the issue proceeds are 233 million dollars for dividend-protected 
convertibles. In addition to issue characteristics, we examine issuers’ stock return 
volatility and financial slack. We examine two measures of financial slack: cash and 
short-term investments scaled by total assets and cash and short-term investments scaled 
by the payment due in the event of a failed call. A call will fail to force conversion when 
the conversion value drops below the call price by the end of the notice period and 
convertible bondholders will tender their bonds for cash. Return volatility and financial 
slack are related to the probability and costs of a failed call and therefore could affect the 
decision on when to call a convertible bond (see Jaffee and Shleifer, 1990; King and 
Mauer, 2012). We find no significant difference between the stock return volatility and 
financial slack for convertibles with and without dividend protection. In fact, we find that 
no variable in Table IV shows a significant difference at the 5% level between the 
dividend-protected and non-dividend-protected convertible bonds in our sample. 
Table V shows the call delay in trading days for convertibles that are called in-the-
money, again distinguishing between convertibles with and without dividend protection. 
                                                 
20 Veld and Zabolotnyuk (2012) study call policies for firms with multiple convertible bonds outstanding 
and the likelihood of a future call given a past call. Our sample of 95 convertibles is issued by 89 different 
firms. There are only six firms with more than one observation of an in-the-money call.   
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We focus on call delay rather than on the call premium since a call premium can be high 
due to the existence of a call protection period. Even when a convertible is redeemed on 
the first day after the call protection period expires, the conversion value can exceed the 
call price by a large percentage. Similarly, the call premium will be high if the 
convertible bond is called under a provisional redemption feature.  
 
[ please insert Table V here ] 
 
We measure the cumulative call delay as the total number of trading days prior to a 
call announcement on which the convertible is both in-the-money and callable. The 
average cumulative call delay is 66.45 days for non-dividend-protected convertible bonds 
and only 2.85 days for dividend-protected convertibles. We also report the continuous 
call delay, defined as the maximum number of trading days before a call announcement 
on which the convertible is continuously in-the-money and callable. We find that non-
dividend-protected convertibles are on average continuously in-the-money for 46.19 days 
before being called, while dividend-protected convertibles are continuously in-the-money 
for an average of 2.85 days. The difference of means between the average call delay for 
dividend-protected and non-dividend-protected convertibles is statistically significant at 
the 1% level for both the cumulative and continuous call delay measures.21  
                                                 
21 Our sample of convertibles that are classified as dividend-protected includes six convertibles with 
minimum threshold amounts or yields and our sample of convertibles that are classified as non-dividend-
protected includes four convertibles with minimum threshold amounts or yields. When excluding these 
convertibles from our sample, we find an average cumulative and continuous call delay of 3.33 days for 
dividend-protected convertible bonds while non-dividend-protected convertible bonds have an average 
cumulative call delay of 64.66 days and an average continuous call delay of 43.16 days. These differences 
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Interestingly, the median call delay is zero: we observe that 37 of the 62 convertible 
bonds with no dividend protection and 24 of the 33 convertible bonds with dividend 
protection have zero call delay. The reported Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistics in Table V 
again lead to the conclusion that dividend-protected convertible bonds exhibit shorter call 
delay than non-dividend-protected convertible bonds. 
The χ²-statistic in Table V compares the categorical distribution of the observations 
with and without dividend protection. We use four call delay categories, consisting of 
convertibles with zero call delay, call delay between 1 and 25 days, call delay between 26 
and 100 days, and call delay exceeding 100 days. The value of the χ²-statistic is 
 22
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 , where Oi is the observed frequency per category and Ei is the 
expected frequency if call delay were independent of dividend protection. The χ²-statistic 
documents a significant difference in the two distributions at the 1% level. Figure 1 
shows that the distribution of call delays for non-dividend-protected convertibles is right-
skewed relative to the distribution for dividend-protected convertibles.  
 
[ please insert Figure 1 here ] 
 
In Table B of Table V we exclude the eight convertible bonds that are in-the-money 
at the end of the call notice period, but that were actually out-of-the-money at the time of 
the call. It can be seen that our results are robust to this exclusion. The average 
                                                                                                                                                 
between convertible bonds with and without dividend protection are statistically significant, with difference 
of means t-statistics of 2.559 for cumulative call delay and 2.983 for continuous call delay. 
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cumulative call delay is 75 days for non-dividend-protected convertible bonds and three 
days for dividend-protected convertible bonds. 
While the average call delay for non-dividend-protected convertibles issued between 
2000 and 2006 is higher than the call delay for dividend-protected convertibles in this 
period, the average is lower than the call delay reported in earlier studies. Asquith (1995) 
reports an average call delay of 170 days for a sample of convertible bonds issued 
between 1980 and 1982, and King and Mauer (2012) report an average 118 day delay for 
convertibles issued in the 1980 to 2002 period. Perhaps the same reason that underlies the 
reduction in call delay through time also explains the difference in the call delay for non-
dividend-protected and dividend-protected convertibles. Most notably, call delay could 
have decreased over time as a result of a potential decrease in dividends through time. If 
a firm will pay only small or no dividends, then each of the Constantinides-Grundy, 
Asquith-Mullins and extended Harris-Raviv rationales for delay become moot. Thus we 
examine whether there is a difference in the call delay of dividend-protected and non-
dividend-protected convertibles controlling for whether the underlying shares pay a 
dividend.  
We find that 38 of the 95 convertible bonds that are called in-the-money were issued 
by dividend-paying firms. Panel A of Table VI reports the average call delay for the non-
dividend-protected and dividend-protected convertibles in this set. We observe an 
average cumulative (continuous) call delay of 104.53 days (73.17 days) for non-dividend-
protected convertible bonds and an average cumulative and continuous call delay of 0.13 
days for dividend-protected convertible bonds. The average cumulative (continuous) 
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delay is significantly longer for non-dividend-protected convertibles than for dividend-
protected convertibles at the 5% (1%) level. 
 
[ please insert Table VI here ] 
 
We further examine the difference in the call delay of dividend-protected and non-
dividend-protected convertibles when the dividend is at a level that might justify a call 
delay if the bond is not dividend-protected. The Asquith-Mullins tax wedge rationale 
justifies a delay so long as dividends are (expected) to exceed the after-tax coupon. We 
follow King and Mauer (2012) and take as the dividend the largest annual dividend per 
share on the common stock paid during the period when the convertible was callable 
multiplied by the conversion rate. To estimate the marginal tax rate, we use Graham’s 
simulated tax database and multiply the annual coupon payment by one minus the firm’s 
marginal corporate tax rate in the year that the convertible is callable and the conversion 
option first becomes in-the-money.22  
For only 23 of the 95 called bonds was the dividend to be received upon conversion 
greater than the after-tax coupon. This is the interesting set where, but for dividend 
protection, a (tax-wedge) rational for delay might be invoked. We report the average call 
delay for convertibles satisfying the Asquith-Mullins condition for call delay in Panel B 
of Table VI. The average cumulative (continuous) call delay is 161 (109) days for non-
dividend-protected convertible bonds. We find zero call delay for dividend-protected 
convertible bonds. Both the average cumulative and continuous delays are significantly 
                                                 
22 If this year is 2010, we use the marginal tax rate of the firm in 2009. In a robustness test, we have used a 
marginal tax rate of 35% for all our observations and this does not change our conclusions. 
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longer at the 5% level for the 18 non-dividend-protected convertibles than for the five 
dividend-protected convertibles. 
As a control for a possible change in call policy over time that is not caused by 
dividend protection features, we focus in Table VII on only those convertible bonds 
issued in 2003. In that year both dividend-protected and non-dividend-protected 
convertibles are well represented. 
 
[ please insert Table VII here ] 
 
 
It can be seen that average call delay is significantly shorter for dividend-protected 
convertible bonds issued in 2003 (average cumulative call delay of 3.00 days) than for 
non-dividend-protected convertibles issued in 2003 (average cumulative call delay of 
68.35 days).  
Table VIII reports an alternate control for any changes in call policy through time. 
For each year we report the average call delay for dividend-protected and non-dividend-
protected convertibles that first became both in-the-money and callable in that year. The 
delay for non-dividend-protected convertibles is greater than that for dividend-protected 
convertibles in each of the seven years with called convertible bonds of both types. The 
probability of the observed pattern of delay when in any year each type was equally 
likely to exhibit the shorter call delay is only 0.57; i.e., less than 1%. 
 
[ please insert Table VIII here ] 
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The results in Tables V, VI, VII and VIII suggest that the dividend protection of 
convertible bonds has a strong impact on call delay. The difference is not due to a 
difference in the dividends paid on the shares of companies whose convertibles are and 
are not dividend-protected. Nor is the difference due to the fact that dividend-protected 
convertible bonds tend to have been issued more recently than non-dividend-protected 
convertible bonds. 
The virtual disappearance of call delay for dividend-protected convertible bonds 
suggests that the original Harris and Raviv (1985) signaling model in which call delay 
signals a high likelihood of conversion at maturity is not empirically descriptive. An 
extended Harris-Raviv model where delay signals a high likelihood of dividend-induced 
voluntary conversion prior to maturity is not ruled out. Our results also indicate that call 
delay rationales based on the notice period and a safety premium may not be of first order 
importance in explaining call delay. Still, it is interesting to note that even observations 
with zero call delay do not necessarily provide evidence against the potential relevance of 
a safety premium. Call protection and provisional redemption features can lead 
convertible bonds to trade substantially in-the-money before the firm has a first chance to 
call. Even before a call is feasible, the conversion value of these convertible bonds can be 
above 120% of the call price, which Asquith and Mullins (1991) assume as a typical 
safety premium. However, for 35 of the 95 convertibles classified as called in-the-money 
the conversion value does not exceed 120% of the call price on the day of the call 
announcement. Within the dividend-protected sample, for 11 of the 33 convertibles 
classified as called in-the-money the conversion value at the time of the call 
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announcement is less than 120% of the call price.23 Moreover, strong evidence against 
the importance of the safety premium rationale is provided by the eight convertible bonds 
that are called when they were actually just out-of-the-money. 
  
B. Dividend protection and hedge fund involvement 
Brown, Grundy, Lewis and Verwijmeren (2012) show that hedge funds are the 
principal purchasers of convertible bond issues after 2000. They further show that hedge 
funds prefer convertible securities without call features as hedge funds combine their 
purchase of convertible bonds with short positions in the issuer’s stock, and non-
predictable call policy complicates this hedging strategy. Hedge funds’ preference for 
predictable call policy thus suggests that there will be a positive relation between hedge 
fund involvement and dividend protection as the optimal call policy for dividend-
protected convertible bonds is simply to call the convertible bond as soon as conversion 
can be forced. We follow Brown, Grundy, Lewis and Verwijmeren (2012) and obtain 
hedge fund involvement by downloading convertible registration statements from SEC 
Edgar. Many registration statements contain the names of the original purchasers of the 
convertible bonds and we classify these buyers as hedge funds and non-hedge funds.24 
We start with our sample of 95 convertible issues that are called while being in-the-
                                                 
23 Nine of the 33 dividend-protected convertibles and 23 of our sample of 95 convertibles are called with a 
safety premium not exceeding 10% of the call price. 
24 See Brown, Grundy, Lewis and Verwijmeren (2012) for a detailed description of this procedure. The 
registration statements only contain buyer information for convertibles that are privately placed, which is 
the large majority of recent convertible issues. Our sample of 95 convertible bonds that are called in-the-
money contains 90 private placements.   
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money and we are able to obtain registration statements with buyer information for 85 of 
these issues.  
 
[ please insert Table IX here ] 
 
In Panel A of Table IX, we examine the fraction of convertible bond issues that are 
purchased by hedge funds. On average, hedge funds purchase 71.0% of the convertibles 
in our sample, which is relatively close to the finding of Brown, Grundy, Lewis and 
Verwijmeren (2012) that hedge funds purchase 73.4% of the convertible issues over the 
period 2000 – 2008. We find that hedge fund involvement is significantly larger for 
convertible issues with dividend protection: Hedge funds purchase on average 76.6% of 
convertible issues with dividend protection and 68.6% of convertible issues without 
dividend protection. We also examine the number of hedge funds involved in a 
convertible issue, divided by the total number of buyers of the convertible issue. We find 
that hedge funds represent 60.6% of the buyers of dividend-protected convertible issues 
and 49.3% of the buyers of convertible bonds without dividend protection.   
Potentially, it could be that hedge fund involvement rather than dividend protection 
drives the difference in call delay between convertibles with and without dividend 
protection. We examine this possibility in Panels B and C of Table IX. Panel B considers 
the percentage of the issue purchased by hedge funds, and Panel C considers the 
percentage of the purchasers that are hedge funds. We report the mean cumulative and 
continuous call delays for three subsamples of the 85 issues defined as issues with low 
hedge fund involvement (28 observations), medium hedge fund involvement (29 
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observations), and high hedge fund involvement (28 observations).25 In every pair-wise 
comparison the call delay for dividend-protected convertibles is significantly less than 
that for non-dividend-protected convertible bonds. Importantly, this is true regardless of 
whether hedge funds have low or high involvement in the issue. Thus the disappearance 
of call delay is associated with the appearance of dividend protection and not driven by 
the emergence of hedge funds as a major purchaser of convertible bonds. 
 
C. Convertibles that have not been called 
In this subsection we examine 104 convertible bonds issued during 2000 – 2006 that 
were at some stage prior to 1-1-2011 not protected against a call, and that either matured, 
are still outstanding at 1-1-2011, or are fully voluntary converted before 2011. 
 
[ please insert Table X here ] 
 
Table X shows that the large majority of these non-called convertible bonds (93 of 
the 104 convertible bonds) have simply never been in-the-money. Only 11 convertibles 
were both in-the-money and not call-protected for at least one trading day before 1-1-
                                                 
25 The bucket with low hedge fund involvement contains 4 dividend-protected convertible bonds when 
examining the fraction of proceeds purchased by hedge funds, and 5 dividend-protected convertible bonds 
when examining the fraction of purchasers that are hedge funds. The bucket with medium hedge fund 
involvement contains 9 dividend-protected convertible bonds when examining the fraction of proceeds 
purchased by hedge funds, and 7 dividend-protected convertible bonds when examining the fraction of 
purchasers that are hedge funds. The bucket with high hedge fund involvement contains 13 dividend-
protected convertible bonds when examining the fraction of proceeds purchased by hedge funds, and 14 
dividend-protected convertible bonds when examining the fraction of purchasers that are hedge funds. 
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2011, and yet were not called.26 Four of these convertibles have dividend protection. This 
low number of observations shows how rare deviations from the optimal call policy of 
Ingersoll (1977a) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977) have become. Table XI reports the 
average number of trading days that the conversion option is in-the-money for this small 
number of observations.  
 
[ please insert Table XI here ] 
 
 
We observe an average cumulative call delay of 26 days for the four convertibles with 
dividend protection, meaning that these non-called convertibles have been in-the-money 
for 26 days before they matured, fell out-of-the-money, were voluntary converted, or 
before we reach 1-1-2011. The average cumulative call delay is 188 days for non-
dividend-protected convertibles. Regarding continuous call delay, we obtain an average 
delay of 24 and 168 days for dividend-protected and non-dividend-protected convertible 
bonds, respectively. The maximum call delay for dividend-protected convertibles is 33 
days, while it is 495 for the non-dividend-protected convertibles. These findings again 
highlight the virtual disappearance of long call delays now that the majority of 
convertibles have dividend protection.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
                                                 
26 One of these 11 bonds was eventually fully converted, three convertible bonds matured, and seven 
convertible bonds are still outstanding at 1-1-2011 (four of these dropped out-of-the-money again before 1-
1-2011). 
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Prior studies find that a substantial number of firms do not immediately call a 
convertible bond when the bond’s conversion value first exceeds its call price. A natural 
extension of Harris and Raviv (1985) as well as the analyses of Constantinides and 
Grundy (1986) and Asquith and Mullins (1991) all suggest that call delays can be optimal 
provided the dividends that bondholders forgo by not converting are sufficiently high 
relative to the (after-tax) coupon cost of the bond to the issuing firm.  
We document that a recent change in convertible security design has had a significant 
impact on convertible call delay. The conversion rate of the majority of convertible bonds 
issued after 2002 is adjusted for cash dividend payments in such a way that voluntary 
conversion is no longer optimal. The convertibles are dividend-protected: The 
bondholder receives her coupons and in the event of a dividend on the common stock she 
receives an increase in the conversion value of her bonds such that the value of the shares 
into which the bond is convertible is not reduced when the stock goes ex-dividend. The 
Constantinides-Grundy, Asquith-Mullins and extended Harris-Raviv rationales for call 
delay then no longer apply. Dividend protection thus provides the perfect control for 
current and future dividend policy, which allows us to test the original prediction by 
Ingersoll (1977a) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977) that stockholders will prefer to force 
conversion as soon as the conversion value first exceeds the call price. We find that 
dividend-protected convertibles are indeed called almost immediately after their 
conversion value exceeds their call price, which shows that finance theory can be highly 
useful in understanding managerial behavior.  
Our paper is the first to document the dividend protection of recent convertible bond 
issues. As we show in our paper, this innovation in convertible security design has 
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resulted in the virtual disappearance of convertible call delay. Dividend protection is also 
important for studies on convertible bond (under)pricing, as dividend protection affects 
the correct calculation of convertible bond values and thus the measurement of any 
underpricing at the time of issue. When the algorithms used to value a convertible bond 
are not adjusted for dividend protection, the theoretical value of a convertible bond will 
be underestimated. In addition, the delta of a convertible and the size of delta-neutral 
positions for convertible arbitrageurs will be misestimated when dividend protection is 
not taken into account.  
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Figure 1. Call delay for convertibles with and without dividend protection  
This figure shows the percentage of convertibles with zero call delay, call delay between 
1 and 25 days, call delay between 26 and 100 days, and call delay exceeding 100 days. 
Dividend protection indicates that the conversion rate for the convertible bond will be 
adjusted for regular cash dividends. Cumulative call delay is the number of trading days 
before the call announcement date that the convertible bond is in-the-money and callable. 
Continuous call delay is the number of trading days before the call announcement date 
that the convertible bond is continuously in-the-money and callable. 
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Table I. Summary statistics and distribution of dividend protection over time 
 
Descriptive statistics for convertible issues during the years 2000 to 2006. Issue proceeds 
are the gross proceeds in millions of dollars, as reported in SDC. The coupon rate is the 
yearly coupon as a percentage of the principal. The conversion premium is the percentage 
difference between the conversion price and the stock price on the issue date. Time to 
maturity is the number of years between issue and maturity. Years to first call are the 
number of years that the bond is fully call-protected. Optional redemption is a dummy 
equal to one if the convertible includes a call feature (that does not put a requirement on 
the minimum stock price). Provisional redemption is a dummy equal to one if the 
convertible bond includes a feature specifying that the firm can call the bond provided the 
stock price exceeds the conversion price by a specified percentage for a specified number 
of trading days within a given period. Put rights is a dummy equal to one if the 
convertible bondholder can require the issuer to repurchase the convertible on specified 
dates at a specified price. Dividend protection is a dummy equal to one if the conversion 
rate for the convertible bond will be adjusted for regular cash dividends. All information 
except issue proceeds is obtained from the issue prospectuses. Panel B reports the number 
and percentage of convertible bond issued each year with dividend protection. 
 
Panel A 
 N Mean Median St.dev. 
Issue proceeds 432 256 150 316 
Coupon rate 432 3.31 3.25 1.77 
Conversion premium 432 32.97 30.33 14.08 
Time to maturity 432 15.56 20.00 8.12 
Years to first call 432 4.33 5.00 1.95 
Optional redemption 432 0.92 1.00 0.27 
Provisional redemption 432 0.23 0.00 0.42 
Put rights 432 0.53 1.00 0.50 
Dividend protection 432 0.57 1.00 0.50 
 
Panel B 
Issue year N Dividend 
protection 
 No dividend 
protection 
% dividend 
protection  
2000 39    0    39    0.0% 
2001 69 8 61 11.6% 
2002 36 0  36 0.0% 
2003 123 76  47 61.8% 
2004 103 100  3 97.1% 
2005 36 36  0 100.0% 
2006 26 25  1 96.2% 
 40
Table II. Convertible retirements 
 
This table shows how the convertible bonds in our sample are retired. The sample 
consists of convertible bonds issued during 2000 – 2006 and we report their status as at 
January 1st, 2011. The classifications are based on information from Factiva, FISD 
Mergent, CRSP, and firms’ annual reports. We obtain information on call protection and 
maturity dates from the issue prospectuses. 
 
  Number of observations   
Merger and acquisition     85   
Bankruptcy  26 
Exchange   10   
Full repurchase    9   
Full exercise of bondholders’ right to put                           6   
Called  135   
Full voluntary conversion    4   
Matured   44   
Outstanding and call-protected at 1-1-2011  57   
Outstanding and callable at 1-1-2011  56   
  432   
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Table III. Convertible bond calls 
 
This table provides information on convertible bond calls. The sample consists of 
convertible bonds issued during 2000 – 2006 and we examine call announcements before 
January 1st, 2011. Dividend protection indicates that the conversion rate for the 
convertible bond will be adjusted for regular cash dividends. A convertible is in-the-
money when the daily closing stock price times the conversion rate exceeds the call price 
plus accrued interest from the last coupon payment date. We adjust the conversion rate 
for stock dividends, stock splits, and extraordinary cash dividends. We obtain information 
on conversion rates and call schedules from the issue prospectuses, and obtain 
information on stock prices, dividends, and stock splits from CRSP. 
 
  Number of observations   
Called convertibles             135   
   Called out-of-the-money  40 
   Called in-the-money  95   
       Dividend protection                        33   
       No dividend protection                         62   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42
Table IV. Dividend protection and other convertible design choices   
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of our non-dividend-protected sample and our 
dividend-protected sample. The sample period is 2000 – 2006. We obtain the monthly 
stock return volatility in the year before the convertible first gets in-the-money by 
calculating the standard deviation of 12 months of monthly stock returns with data from 
CRSP. We use Compustat to obtain financial slack, which is the level of cash and short-
term investments (Item CHE) divided by the size of total assets (AT). We also scale 
financial slack by the payment upon calling when convertible bondholders do not 
convert, which is the call price multiplied by the number of convertibles. The number of 
convertibles and the call price are obtained from the issue prospectuses. See Table I for a 
description of the other variables in this table. We do not assume equal variances when 
estimating difference of means t-statistics. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% 
level. 
 
  No dividend 
protection 
(62 observations) 
Dividend 
protection  
(33 observations) 
Difference of 
means t-statistic 
Issue proceeds  312 233 1.365 
Coupon rate  3.61 3.41 0.560 
Conversion premium  35.90 33.20 0.821 
Time to maturity  14.58 16.79 1.269 
Years to first call  3.68 4.21 1.481 
Optional redemption  0.90 0.94 0.638 
Provisional redemption  0.18 0.27 1.028 
Put rights  0.45 0.64  1.739* 
Stock price volatility  0.09 0.11 1.200 
Total assets  6,987 4,600 1.343 
Cash & short-term 
investments / total 
assets 
 
0.21 0.21 0.085 
Cash & short term 
investments / payment 
upon calling 
 
2.95 2.94 0.015 
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Table V. Call delay for convertible bonds that are called in-the-money 
 
This table reports call delay for convertibles that are called in-the-money. The sample 
consists of convertibles issued during 2000 – 2006 and we examine call announcements 
before January 1st, 2011. In Panel B we exclude eight observations that are in-the-money 
at the end of the call notice period, but that were actually out-of-the-money at the time of 
the call. Dividend protection indicates that the conversion rate for the convertible bond 
will be adjusted for regular cash dividends. Cumulative call delay is the number of 
trading days before the call announcement date that the convertible bond is in-the-money 
and callable. Continuous call delay is the number of trading days before the call 
announcement date that the convertible bond is continuously in-the-money and callable. 
We do not assume equal variances when estimating difference of means t-statistics. The 
chi-square test compares the categorical distribution of the observations with and without 
dividend protection. We use call delay categories of 0 days, 1 to 25 days, 26 to 100 days, 
and greater than 100 days. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Mean Median St. dev. Maximum 
No dividend protection (62 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  66.45    0    179.58    1221 
Continuous call delay 46.19 0 104.39 515 
     
Dividend protection (33 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  2.85 0 6.81 24 
Continuous call delay 2.85 0 6.81 24 
     
Difference of means t-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  2.785***    
Continuous call delay 3.257***    
     
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test z-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  2.010**    
Continuous call delay 1.975**    
     
Chi-square test χ²-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  21.612***    
Continuous call delay 15.271***    
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Panel B 
 Mean Median St. dev. Maximum 
No dividend protection (55 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  74.91    0    189.17    1221 
Continuous call delay 52.87 0 109.53 515 
     
Dividend protection (32 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  2.94 0 6.90 24 
Continuous call delay 2.94 0 6.90 24 
     
Difference of means t-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  2.818***    
Continuous call delay 3.316***    
     
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test z-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  2.396**    
Continuous call delay 2.336**    
     
Chi-square test χ²-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  21.510***    
Continuous call delay 15.710***    
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Table VI. Call delay for convertible bonds that are called in-the-money and issued 
by dividend-paying firms 
 
This table reports call delay for convertibles that are issued during 2000 – 2006 and are 
called in-the-money. We examine call announcements before January 1st, 2011. The 
sample in Panel A consists of convertibles of firms that pay a cash dividend at least once 
during the life of the convertible. The sample in Panel B consists of firms in which 
dividends exceed the after-tax coupons. Dividend protection indicates that the conversion 
rate for the convertible bond will be adjusted for regular cash dividends. Cumulative call 
delay is the number of trading days before the call announcement that the convertible 
bond is in-the-money and callable. Continuous call delay is the number of trading days 
before the call announcement that the convertible bond is continuously in-the-money and 
callable. We do not assume equal variances when estimating difference of means t-
statistics. The chi-square test compares the categorical distribution of the observations 
with and without dividend protection. We use call delay categories of 0 days, 1 to 25 
days, 26 to 100 days, and above 100 days. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Mean Median St. dev. Maximum 
No dividend protection (30 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  104.53    0     244.11    1221 
Continuous call delay 73.17 0 140.55 515 
     
Dividend protection (8 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  0.13 0 0.35 1 
Continuous call delay 0.13 0 0.35 1 
     
Difference of means t-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  2.343**    
Continuous call delay 2.846***    
     
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test z-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  1.801*    
Continuous call delay 1.801*    
     
Chi-square test χ²-statistic    
Cumulative call delay  4.684    
Continuous call delay 3.746    
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Panel B 
 Mean Median St. dev. Maximum 
No dividend protection (18 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  160.78    11.50     303.21    1221 
Continuous call delay 109.11 11.50 170.12 515 
     
Dividend protection (5 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  0 0 0 0 
Continuous call delay 0 0 0 0 
     
Difference of means t-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  2.250**    
Continuous call delay 2.721**    
     
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test z-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  1.905*    
Continuous call delay 1.905*    
     
Chi-square test χ²-statistic     
Cumulative call delay  5.000    
Continuous call delay 5.000    
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Table VII. Call delay for convertible bonds issued in 2003  
 
This table reports call delay for convertible bonds that have been issued in 2003 and were 
subsequently called in-the-money prior to January 1st, 2011. Dividend protection 
indicates that the conversion rate for the convertible bond will be adjusted for regular 
cash dividends. Cumulative call delay is the number of trading days before the call 
announcement that the convertible is both in-the-money and callable. Continuous call 
delay is the number of trading days before the call announcement that the convertible 
bond is continuously in-the-money and callable. We do not assume equal variances when 
estimating difference of means t-statistics. The chi-square test compares the categorical 
distribution of the observations with and without dividend protection. For this test we use 
call delay categories of 0 days, 1 to 25 days, 26 to 100 days, and above 100 days. *** and 
** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 Mean Median St. dev. Maximum 
No dividend protection (17 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  68.35    0   112.83    348 
Continuous call delay 40.65 0 64.25 227 
     
Dividend protection (14 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  3.00 0 6.39 23 
Continuous call delay 3.00 0 6.39 23 
     
Difference of means t-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  2.384**    
Continuous call delay 2.401**    
     
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test z-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  0.819    
Continuous call delay 0.819    
     
Chi-square test χ²-statistic    
Cumulative call delay  37.486***    
Continuous call delay 37.486***  
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Table VIII. Call delay segregated by year 
 
This table reports call delay for convertibles that are issued during 2000 – 2006 and first 
become both in-the-money and not call-protected during a particular year. We segregate 
by the year in which these two conditioning events occurred. We examine call 
announcements before January 1st, 2011. Dividend protection indicates that the 
conversion rate for the convertible bond will be adjusted for regular cash dividends. 
Cumulative call delay is the number of trading days before the call announcement that the 
convertible is both in-the-money and callable. Continuous call delay is the number of 
trading days before the call announcement that the convertible bond is continuously in-
the-money and callable.  
 
Year No dividend protection  Dividend protection 
 N Cumulative 
call delay 
Continuous 
call delay 
 N Cumulative 
call delay 
Continuous 
call delay 
2010 2 48.00 48.00  9 3.56 3.56 
2009 1 325.00 325.00  6 4.00 4.00 
2008 11 70.36 30.27  9 2.89 2.89 
2007 8 64.38 64.38  1 0.00 0.00 
2006 10 56.70 50.40  2 2.50 2.50 
2005 13 120.00 63.69  1 6.00 6.00 
2004 12 17.92 16.25  5 0.20 0.20 
2003 5 13.60 13.60  0   
 62    33   
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Table IX. Dividend protection and hedge fund involvement   
 
This table shows the relation between dividend protection, hedge fund involvement, and 
call delay for the 85 convertible bond issues in the 2000 – 2006 period with information 
on hedge fund involvement. We obtain hedge fund involvement by following Brown, 
Grundy, Lewis and Verwijmeren (2012). Panel A reports hedge fund involvement in our 
overall sample, our non-dividend-protected sample and our dividend-protected sample. 
Panels B and C report the mean call delays for three subsamples of the 85 issues defined 
as those with low hedge fund involvement (28 observations), medium hedge fund 
involvement (29 observations), and high hedge fund involvement (28 observations). 
Panel B considers the fraction of a convertible issue purchased by hedge funds, and Panel 
C considers the fraction of the purchasers involved in a convertible issue that can be 
classified as hedge funds. We do not assume equal variances when estimating difference 
of means t-statistics between convertibles with and without dividend protection. ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Overall  
 
(85 obs.) 
No dividend 
protection 
(59 obs.) 
Dividend 
protection  
(26 obs.) 
Difference 
of means t-
statistic 
Fraction of proceeds 
purchased by hedge 
funds 
 
0.710 0.686 0.766 2.272** 
Fraction of purchasers 
that are hedge funds 0.528 0.493 0.606 2.458** 
 
Panel B 
 No dividend 
protection 
Dividend 
protection 
 Difference of 
means t-statistic 
Low fraction of proceeds purchased by hedge funds   
Cumulative call delay 25.54 1.00  2.238** 
Continuous call delay 24.71 1.00  2.156** 
     
Medium fraction of proceeds purchased by hedge funds   
Cumulative call delay 66.40 0.11  2.100** 
Continuous call delay 53.35 0.11  1.798* 
     
High fraction of proceeds purchased by hedge funds   
Cumulative call delay 145.27 1.54  1.779* 
Continuous call delay 80.27 1.54  2.381** 
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Panel C 
 No dividend 
protection 
Dividend 
protection 
 Difference of 
means t-statistic 
Low fraction of purchasers that are hedge funds   
Cumulative call delay 17.70 0.00  2.521** 
Continuous call delay 15.78 0.00  2.329** 
     
Medium fraction of purchasers that are hedge funds   
Cumulative call delay 58.73 0.00  2.298** 
Continuous call delay 55.45 0.00  2.182** 
     
High fraction of purchasers that are hedge funds   
Cumulative call delay 172.93 1.79  1.943* 
Continuous call delay 91.50 1.79  2.268** 
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Table X. Convertible bonds that were never called yet at some stage were not call-
protected  
 
This table reports whether those convertibles not called prior to 1-1-2011 were ever 
previously in-the-money and not call-protected. The sample consists of convertibles 
issued during 2000 – 2006. Dividend protection indicates that the conversion rate for the 
convertible bond will be adjusted for regular cash dividends. For non-dividend-protected 
convertibles, a convertible is in-the-money when the daily closing stock price times the 
conversion rate exceeds the call price plus accrued interest from the last coupon payment 
date. We adjust the conversion rate for stock dividends, stock splits, and extraordinary 
cash dividends. For dividend-protected convertibles we also adjust the conversion rate for 
regular cash dividends. We obtain information on conversion rates and call schedules 
from the issue prospectuses, and obtain information on stock prices, dividends, and stock 
splits from CRSP. 
 
  Number of observations   
Convertibles not called while not call- 
protected 
                  104   
Never in-the-money and not call-protected 93 
           Full voluntary conversion                         3 
           Matured                        41 
           Still outstanding at 1-1-2011                        49 
At some point in-the-money and not call-
protected 
 11   
           Dividend protection                        4   
           No dividend protection                         7   
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Table XI. Call delay for non-called convertible bonds 
 
This table reports call delay for non-called convertible bonds that are both in-the-money 
and not call-protected at some time prior to 1-1-2011. The sample consists of convertibles 
issued during 2000 – 2006 and we examine call announcements before January 1st, 2011. 
Dividend protection indicates that the conversion rate for the convertible bond will be 
adjusted for regular cash dividends. Cumulative call delay is the number of trading days 
that the convertible bond is in-the-money and callable. Continuous call delay is the 
number of trading days that the convertible bond is continuously in-the-money and 
callable. We do not assume equal variances when estimating difference of means t-
statistics. The chi-square test compares the categorical distribution of the observations 
with and without dividend protection. We use call delay categories of 1 to 25 days, 26 to 
100 days, and above 100 days. *** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
 Mean Median St. dev. Maximum 
No dividend protection (7 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  188.43    102    203.47    495 
Continuous call delay 167.86 38 199.14 495 
     
Dividend protection (4 observations) 
Cumulative call delay  26.25 30 9.74 33 
Continuous call delay 23.75 26 8.66 32 
     
Difference of means t-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  2.105*    
Continuous call delay 1.911    
     
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test z-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  0.756    
Continuous call delay 0.758    
     
Chi-square test χ²-statistic 
Cumulative call delay  12.625***    
Continuous call delay 6.333*    
 
 
 
 
 
